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ABSTRACT 
 
In R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, the Supreme Court of the 
United Kingdom (a) held that the UK Government had no prerogative power to initiate the 
formal process whereby the UK will withdraw from the EU and (b) declined to recognise any 
requirement that the devolved legislatures’ consent be obtained in respect of legislation 
authorising the Government to commence the withdrawal process. This article critically 
examines Miller, arguing that the majority’s analysis veers between unwarranted muscularity 
in relation to the prerogative issue and unnecessary conservatism as regards the devolution 
issue. The article goes on to argue that while the majority judgment’s restrictive approach to 
the prerogative may be viewed as a progressive victory for constitutional principle, such an 
evaluation can be sustained only if a set of relatively traditional constitutional premises are 
adopted to begin with. The article also contends that the general approach adopted by the 
majority is problematic, given its willingness to invoke arguments of constitutional principle 
without adequately engaging with questions about what the pertinent principles are, and 
argues that such an intellectually lackadaisical mode of constitutional adjudication is to be 
deprecated.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
By voting to leave the European Union in the referendum that was held on 23 June 2016, the 
people of the United Kingdom initiated a sequence of events that will have profound social, 
economic, political, legal and constitutional consequences. The precise nature of those 
consequences is as yet far from certain. But when in due course they begin to emerge, and 
the first drafts of the history of “Brexit” come to be written, the decision of the Supreme Court 
of the United Kingdom in R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union1 will 
doubtless feature. For a few short months following the referendum, all eyes were on the 
courts as they determined who had the legal authority to initiate the process by which the UK 
will withdraw from the EU under Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (“TEU”). The Court 
held, by a majority of eight to three, that the Government could not use prerogative power to 
trigger the withdrawal process. That step, it was held, could be taken only with Parliament’s 
legislative blessing. 2  That blessing was subsequently conferred by the European Union 
(Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017, giving the Prime Minister the power to initiate the Article 
50 process — a step that she took on 29 March 2017.  
 In this way, the Supreme Court staked its claim as one of the dramatis personae in the 
early chapters of the Brexit story. Yet for future historians seeking to make sense of that story, 
the Miller judgment might ultimately warrant only a brief mention. After all, involving the Court 
did not stop Brexit in its tracks. Nor did Parliament take the opportunity to enact legislation 
limiting the Government’s freedom to negotiate the terms of Brexit. For lawyers, however, the 
significance (or otherwise) of the case does not lie in the political ramifications that it did (or 
did not) produce. Viewed from the vantage point of constitutional law, questions about where 
power lies are fundamental. And so, far from acting as the “enemies of the people”, as one 
newspaper3 balefully described the judges who decided Miller at first instance,4 the case 
engaged the axiomatic judicial function of determining disputes about how constitutional 
authority is allocated. That the courts acted entirely properly by deciding the case is therefore 
beyond question. It does not, however, follow that the same is true of the conclusions that 
were reached or of the underlying reasoning. This article focusses upon, and takes issue with, 
three key aspects of the majority judgment.  
First, the majority’s conclusion regarding the unavailability of the prerogative turned 
significantly upon its view that “major” constitutional changes can be made only by legislation. 
Yet that notion lacks support in authority, imports into the law a novel and highly imprecise 
criterion by which prerogative power is delimited and rests upon normative constitutional 
foundations that are unarticulated and arguably absent.5 Second, the majority held that the 
prerogative could not be used to initiate Brexit because the EU Treaties and EU legislation 
are an “independent source” of domestic law. This reasoning does not withstand scrutiny.6 
                                                 
1 [2017] UKSC 5, [2017] 2 W.L.R. 583 (hereinafter ‘Miller’).  
2 The majority consisted of Lord Neuberger, Lady Hale, Lord Mance, Lord Kerr, Lord Clarke, Lord 
Wilson, Lord Sumption and Lord Hodge. Lord Reed, Lord Carnwath and Lord Hughes dissented.  
3 Daily Mail, 4 November 2016, p. 1.  
4 [2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin), [2017] 1 All E.R. 158. 
5 See section III below.  
6 See section IV below.  
Third, it was argued that constitutional convention required legislation initiating withdrawal 
from the EU to be enacted only if the devolved legislatures consented. The Court, however, 
refused to determine that matter. Whereas it was too quick to invoke questionable arguments 
of constitutional principle in order to sustain its analysis of the prerogative issue, the majority 
was arguably too slow to pay heed to the constitutional principles implicated by the devolution 
issue.7  
It is possible to paint Miller as an affirmation of fundamental constitutional principle — 
most obviously the sovereignty of Parliament. The executive, after all, was put firmly in (what 
the majority took to be) its constitutional place. And the sovereign Westminster Parliament 
was put equally firmly in the driving seat, free from the competing claims represented by (on 
the one hand) the Government’s innate prerogative authority and (on the other hand) the 
devolved legislatures’ asserted rights of constitutional participation. It will be argued, however, 
that the reasoning that delivered these outcomes reflects an understanding of the constitution 
that is inadequately subtle, veering as it does between muscular but ill-focussed constitutional 
assertiveness and unwarranted conservativism. That, in turn, raises questions — which are 
addressed towards the end of this article8 — about the nature of constitutional adjudication 
and about the contrasting approaches to it adopted by the majority and dissenting Justices in 
Miller.  
II.  THE CENTRAL ISSUES 
A.  Article 50 
Central to the issues at stake in Miller is the operation of the process under Article 50 TEU 
whereby Member States can withdraw from the EU. The first three paragraphs of Article 50 
provide as follows:  
(1) Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with 
its own constitutional requirements.  
(2) A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council 
of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, 
the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting 
out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its 
future relationship with the Union … It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union 
by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the 
European Parliament. 
(3) The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry 
into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the 
notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in 
agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend 
this period. 
                                                 
7 See section V below. In the principal dissenting judgment, Lord Reed concluded that the argument 
based on convention did not, on his analysis, arise, because, on his view, no legislation to which 
devolved consent could be given was required: Miller, at [177].  
8 See section VI below.  
The structure of Article 50 is such that once notice is served under Article 50(2), a two-year 
countdown begins. Unless agreement is reached sooner or time is extended by mutual 
agreement, the withdrawing Member State leaves the EU at the end of the two-year period, 
whether on agreed terms or simply by dint of the Treaties no longer applying. Thus the default 
(albeit not the inevitable) consequence of triggering Article 50 is that the EU Treaties cease in 
due course to apply, depriving those in the UK of currently available legal rights. As the written 
case for the lead claimant put it, notification amounts to “the pulling of the trigger which causes 
the bullet to be fired, with the consequence that the bullet will hit the target and the Treaties 
will cease to apply”.9 Whether a Member State can withdraw its notification and halt the Article 
50 process — thereby returning the metaphorical bullet to the chamber after the gun has been 
fired — was not determined by the Court, the parties having been content to proceed on the 
basis that an Article 50 notification is not unilaterally revocable. 10  It was against this 
background that the claimant’s core point fell to be made: that the consequences of triggering 
Article 50 were such as to preclude that step from being taken under the prerogative.  
B.  The prerogative 
In Blackburn v Attorney General, Lord Denning MR said that “[t]he treaty-making power of this 
country rests … in the Crown; that is, Her Majesty acting upon the advice of her Ministers”.11 
It followed that “[w]hen … Ministers negotiate and sign a treaty, they … exercise the 
prerogative of the Crown”.12 This is entirely uncontroversial, and, as Lord Reed observed in 
Miller, there are “compelling practical reasons for recognising this prerogative power to 
manage international relations”. 13  It is equally uncontroversial that the treaty-making 
prerogative extends to the unmaking of treaties. However, it was argued in Miller that that 
general proposition had to yield in the circumstances of the case. In particular, it was said that 
it would be incompatible with the European Communities Act 1972 (“ECA”) for the prerogative 
to be used so as to initiate a process whose default consequence would be the loss of EU law 
rights given effect by the Act. The argument was put in the following terms in an influential 
blogpost that prefigured the Miller litigation:  
The obvious intention of the Act is to provide for the UK’s membership of the EU 
and for the EU Treaties to have effect in domestic law. The purpose of triggering 
Article 50 would be [to] cut across the Act and render it nugatory. Once a 
                                                 
9 Lead claimant’s written case, para. 12.  
10 Although the question of revocability might seem to be key, it is at least arguable that it is a red 
herring. As G. Peretz, “Will the Supreme Court have to make a reference to the Court of Justice of the 
EU in Miller?: Further thoughts”, Monckton Chambers Brexit Blog, 14 November 2016, argues, even if 
Parliament could intervene to prevent an Article 50 notification from resulting in Brexit, the fundamental 
principle remains that “the Royal Prerogative should not be able to remove statutory rights without a 
positive act by Parliament, namely a specific statutory power or an Act of Parliament”. On this analysis, 
even if the Article 50 notification were unilaterally revocable by the UK, that would not impact upon the 
question whether legislation is needed to authorise the initiation of the withdrawal process.  
11 [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1037, 1040.  
12 Ibid., at p. 1040 
13 Miller, at [160]. See also T. Endicott, Parliament and the Prerogative: From the Case of Proclamations 
to Miller (London: Policy Exchange, 2016).  
withdrawal agreement took effect, or if [no] deal was reached, the 1972 Act would 
be left as a dead letter.14 
On this view, using the prerogative to trigger Article 50 would offend fundamental constitutional 
axioms concerning the relationship between prerogative power and the authority of primary 
legislation, a key implication of latter’s priority over the former being that the prerogative cannot 
be used in a way that is incompatible with statute. That proposition is itself uncontentious; 
indeed, it is an inevitable corollary of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. From this 
central insight concerning statute and the prerogative flow several other propositions. As the 
majority judgment in Miller put it, its “residual nature” means that “a prerogative power will be 
displaced in a field which becomes occupied by a corresponding power conferred or regulated 
by statute”;15 that the prerogative “does not enable ministers to change statute law or common 
law”;16 and that ministers cannot “frustrate the purpose of a statute or a statutory provision, for 
example by emptying it of content or preventing its effectual operation”. 17  Importantly, 
however, these propositions could not on their own be determinative of whether the 
prerogative could be used to trigger Article 50. Rather, the answer to that question turned 
upon how those propositions applied in the light of two further considerations — namely, the 
proper interpretation of the ECA and the domestic status of EU law. As we will see, it was their 
different approaches to these matters that divided the majority Justices and the dissentients 
— and which revealed a larger fault-line between them, distinguishing two quite different 
modes of constitutional adjudication.  
C.  The European Communities Act 1972 
Whether using the prerogative to invoke Article 50 is precluded by the ECA must turn upon 
what the ECA relevantly provides. For present purposes, section 2(1) is key:  
All such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time to time 
created or arising by or under the Treaties, and all such remedies and procedures 
from time to time provided for by or under the Treaties, as in accordance with the 
Treaties are without further enactment to be given legal effect or used in the United 
Kingdom shall be recognised and available in law, and be enforced, allowed and 
followed accordingly …  
On one reading, section 2(1), and the Act more generally, amounts to a scheme that is 
predicated upon — in the sense of presupposing and providing for — UK membership of the 
EU. This view appealed to the majority in Miller, according to which Parliament, by enacting 
the ECA, “endorsed and gave effect” to UK membership “in a way which is inconsistent with 
the future exercise by ministers of any prerogative power to withdraw from such Treaties”.18 
On this analysis, while the Act accommodates the varying content of EU law (e.g. through the 
enactment and revocation of EU legislation) within the context of the UK’s membership of the 
                                                 
14 N. Barber, T. Hickman and J. King, “Pulling the Article 50 ‘Trigger’: Parliament’s Indispensable Role”, 
UK Constitutional Law Blog, 27 June 2016. 
15 Miller, at [48].  
16 Miller, at [50].  
17 Miller, at [51].  
18 Miller, at [77].  
EU, the Act does not accommodate withdrawal. This rules out the use of the prerogative to 
effect withdrawal, for that would be incompatible with the Act.  
 An alternative reading of the Act — one that has a good deal in common with an 
analysis advanced by John Finnis19 — was preferred by Lord Reed in his leading dissenting 
judgment.20 According to Lord Reed, the ECA “imposes no requirement, and manifests no 
intention, in respect of the UK’s membership of the EU”.21 Rather, it amounts to nothing more 
than a “scheme under which the effect given to EU law in domestic law reflects the UK’s 
international obligations under the Treaties, whatever they may be”.22 Lord Reed based this 
analysis in part upon the fact that section 2(1) provides for the domestic legal effect only of 
such rights as are provided for by the Treaties “from time to time”. From this, said Lord Reed, 
it follows that: “Withdrawal under article 50 alters the application of the 1972 Act, but is not 
inconsistent with it.”23 On this view, effecting Brexit will not (as had been suggested) render 
the ECA “a dead letter”,24 because it serves simply to give effect to whatever EU obligations, 
if any, the UK has at any given point in time.  
 In fact, both the majority and Lord Reed acknowledged that section 2(1) gave effect to 
a body of EU law of varying content, the scheme of the Act being to enable domestic law to 
mirror EU law. Thus, as EU legislation is enacted, amended and replaced, so the body of 
rights given effect by section 2(1) alters. However, unlike the majority, Lord Reed was 
prepared to go further, by holding that the ECA can accommodate a situation in which, by dint 
of withdrawal, the body of EU law to which domestic effect falls to be given is non-existent. 
There was, he said, “no basis in the language of the 1972 Act” for drawing any distinction 
between “variations in the content of EU law arising from new EU legislation, and changes 
resulting from withdrawal by the UK from the European Union”.25 In contrast, the majority 
concluded that while the Act could accommodate changes to EU law made by the EU 
institutions or through treaty variation, it could not accommodate the possibility of “complete 
withdrawal”.26 Which view is to be preferred?  
  
                                                 
19 J. Finnis, Brexit and the Balance of our Constitution (London: Policy Exchange, 2016).  
20 Lord Reed’s is the leading dissenting judgment in the sense that it, unlike any other dissenting 
judgment, commanded the support of all the other dissentients.  
21 Miller, at [177].  
22 Miller, at [187].  
23 Miller, at [204].  
24 Barber et al, note 14 above.  
25 Miller, at [187].  
26 Miller, at [81].  
III.  CONSTITUTIONAL “SCALE” 
A.  The role of “scale” in the majority’s reasoning 
Lord Reed’s analysis might be considered by some to be formalistic. But the charge of 
formalism (to the extent that it is, in the first place, considered to be a pejorative charge) can 
be substantiated only if the competing, less “formal”, analysis is premised upon an extra-
textual criterion that is stable and clear enough to serve as a meaningful basis not only for the 
instant decision, but as a guide to future adjudication, and which (relatedly) is anchored in an 
underlying principle that is comprehensible and normatively defensible. Judged by this metric, 
the majority’s reasoning falls short. To the extent that the relevant aspect of the majority’s 
analysis can lay claim to intellectual coherence, it might be said to be animated by the notion 
of constitutional “scale”. The majority observed, for instance, that “in constitutional terms the 
effect of the 1972 Act was unprecedented” and that withdrawal would (necessarily) “constitute 
as significant a constitutional change as that which occurred when EU law was first 
incorporated in domestic law by the 1972 Act”.27 That may well be so. However, the majority 
concluded that from the empirical fact of the constitutional implications of EU membership 
(and hence withdrawal) flowed significant legal consequences.  
Thus it was said that it would be “inconsistent with long-standing and fundamental 
principle for such a far-reaching change to the UK[’s] constitutional arrangements to be 
brought about by ministerial decision or ministerial action alone”.28 And this was no mere 
throwaway line: the “scale” argument is a recurring theme in the crucial parts of the majority 
judgment. We are told, for instance, that “a major change to UK constitutional arrangements 
can[not] be achieved by a ministers alone”;29 that such changes can be “effected in the only 
way that the UK constitution recognises, namely by Parliamentary legislation”;30 that the fact 
that withdrawal would effect “a fundamental change in the constitutional arrangements of the 
United Kingdom” bears decisively upon the question whether “ministers could cause the 
United Kingdom to withdraw from the EU Treaties without prior Parliamentary approval”;31 that 
“the main difficulty with the Secretary of State’s argument” is that it “fails to acknowledge the 
constitutional implications of withdrawal from the EU” which are, because withdrawal is 
entailed, “fundamentally different” from the implications that would flow from “ the abrogation 
of particular rights, duties or rules derived from EU law”;32 and that the “loss of a source of law 
is a fundamental legal change which justifies the conclusion that prerogative powers cannot 
be invoked to withdraw from the EU Treaties”.33 The scale of the constitutional change implied 
by withdrawal from the EU was thus instrumental in leading the majority to the conclusion, 
                                                 
27 Miller, at [81].  
28 Miller, at [81].  
29 Miller, at [82].  
30 Miller, at [82].  
31 Miller, at [82].  
32 Miller, at [81].  
33 Miller, at [83]. 
noted above, that while the ECA accommodates variations in EU law, it should not be 
construed so as to leave intact prerogative authority to effect withdrawal from the EU.34  
B.  The viability of a “scale”-related restriction on the prerogative 
The criterion of “scale”, however, is far from unproblematic. For one thing, it is unclear what, 
if any, legal pedigree it has. The notion that “major”, “fundamental” or “far-reaching” 
constitutional changes cannot be made via the prerogative was said to follow “from the 
ordinary application of basic concepts of constitutional law to the present issue”. 35  It is 
unfortunate, however, that the majority did not see fit to identify those concepts or to show 
why they generate the prohibition to which they are said to give rise. More generally, if the use 
of the prerogative really is now constrained not only by established principles but also by its 
incapacity to do things that have a degree of constitutional significance beyond a given 
threshold, it becomes necessary to identify precisely where that threshold is located. Yet here, 
too, the majority judgment offers little by way of guidance, and even less by way of 
reassurance that the criterion is a serviceable one that is capable of principled and predictable 
application.  
 It may be that EU membership and withdrawal are sui generis, and that no other 
constitutional change that might otherwise be achievable via prerogative power will be 
prohibited by the majority’s criterion of scale. Such a view might be thought to derive some 
support from the fact that the majority describes the EU Treaties as “unique in their legislative 
and constitutional implications”, citing the fact that “for the first time in the history of the United 
Kingdom, a dynamic, international source of law was grafted onto, and above, the well-
established existing sources of domestic law: Parliament and the courts”.36 But it is clear 
neither from the judgment nor in principle that this should be considered the sole ground on 
which a constitutional change might be so significant as to engage the majority’s scale-related 
limitation upon the use of the prerogative. The question thus arises whether the criterion of 
scale might stymie the use of the prerogative in other contexts.  
Consider, for instance, a scenario in which the Government wished to remove the UK 
from the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) using the treaty-making 
prerogative, without first legislating to amend or repeal the Human Rights Act 1998 (“HRA”). 
Could the prerogative be used in such a way, or would Miller preclude this on account of 
departure from the ECHR being so constitutionally significant as to be unachievable through 
the use of prerogative power? As far as the structure of the HRA is concerned, there are 
                                                 
34 It is possible to read the majority judgment, at least in places, even more broadly, i.e. as suggesting 
that the scale argument does not (simply) bear upon questions about how the ECA should be construed, 
but operates instead as an independent and direct constraint upon the use of prerogative power.   
35 Miller, at [82]. The view that “fundamental” constitutional changes can be made only by Parliament 
has something in common with the position adopted by the Court of Appeal in R (Jackson) v Attorney 
General [2005] EWCA Civ 126, [2005] Q.B. 579, in which it was said (at [48]) that certain fundamental 
changes “could only be enacted or expressly made possible by what is traditionally the sovereign 
Parliament” rather than under the Parliament Acts 1911–49. However, the House of Lords went on to 
reject the distinction that the Court of Appeal had sought to draw between fundamental and other 
constitutional changes: R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56, [2006] 1 A.C. 262. 
36 Miller, at [90].  
parallels with the ECA, making the question of ECHR-withdrawal a useful test-bed for the 
reasoning in Miller. Of particular significance are the facts that: the HRA gives effect only to 
the “Convention rights”; those rights are defined as certain provisions of “the Convention”;37 
and “the Convention” means the ECHR “as it has effect for the time being in relation to the 
United Kingdom”.38 Thus it is at least arguable that the HRA only protects Convention rights 
so long as the UK remains a party to the ECHR: if it ceases to be a party, no “Convention 
rights” exist, because the ECHR no longer has effect in relation to the UK. On the face of it, 
therefore, the HRA is susceptible to the sort of “ambulatory” interpretation that the Government 
urged in Miller in respect of the ECA,39 but which foundered, in no small part, because of the 
scale of the constitutional change entailed.40 Would withdrawing from the ECHR be precluded 
on the same ground?  
The domestic constitutional implications of the ECHR and the HRA are not the same 
as those of the EU Treaties and the ECA. The ECHR makes no claim to, and the HRA does 
not seek to ascribe, hierarchical priority to Convention rights within the domestic legal 
system.41 If, therefore, on the analysis of the majority in Miller, recourse to the prerogative is 
precluded on “scale” grounds only if use of the prerogative would disturb a body of 
international law that has been accorded domestic primacy, then the scale argument would 
appear to be inapplicable to the ECHR (and indeed in any other context). However, it would 
be surprising if the constitutional scale argument uniquely had purchase in relation to the 
disturbance of law that originates in the international sphere and has primacy over domestic 
law. If (as we are told by the majority) the principle is that “major” constitutional changes cannot 
be achieved through the prerogative, then it is surely likely that that category of changes 
extends beyond the very particular kind of constitutional change that will be brought about by 
leaving the EU.  
C.  Constitutional “scale” and constitutional principle 
Yet the question remains: how are we to identify the content of that category, so as to assist 
in answering questions such as the one sketched above concerned ECHR-withdrawal? 
Without explicit guidance from the majority, we might seek instead to infer such guidance from 
the underlying reasoning. There is, however, regrettably little to go on. “[L]ong-standing and 
                                                 
37 Human Rights Act 1998, s. 1(1).  
38 Ibid., section 21(1).  
39 Miller, at [74].  
40 For a contrasting analysis, according to which the HRA creates “statutory rights” such that withdrawal 
from the ECHR would not terminate the HRA’s capacity to protect Convention rights, see E. Bjorge, 
“EU rights as British rights”, University of Bristol Law School Blog, 14 November 2016. My present 
purpose is not to assess the merits of these two analyses. Rather, it is to consider whether Miller tells 
again a reading of the HRA that leaves open the possibility of prerogative-instigated withdrawal from 
the ECHR.  
41 Indeed, the HRA explicitly eschews any such claim: legislation, including Acts of the UK Parliament, 
that are found to be incompatible with Convention rights can be declared to be so under section 4(2), 
but such a declaration, according to section 4(6), “does not affect the validity, continuing operation or 
enforcement of the provision in respect of which it is given”.  
fundamental principle”42 is invoked, as are “basic concepts of constitutional law”.43 But what 
are these principles and concepts? In the absence of explicit indications, the inference might 
be made, given the prominence accorded to it elsewhere in the judgment, that the majority 
has in mind parliamentary sovereignty. In UK constitutional law, principles do not get any more 
fundamental than that. And it is certainly the case that the sovereignty doctrine has 
considerable normative purchase upon questions about the extent of prerogative power, using 
such power in a way that would undermine parliamentary legislation being irreconcilable with 
Parliament’s supremacy.  
Perhaps, then, the majority’s argument is that constitutional changes that somehow 
offend parliamentary sovereignty are too serious to be effected via the prerogative. But such 
an argument is problematic. For one thing, it is hard to see what, if anything, it adds to existing 
principles about the way in which parliamentary legislation limits the prerogative. It is already 
the case that the prerogative cannot be used contrary to legislation, irrespective of whether 
the Government seeks to invoke the prerogative for the purpose of effecting major 
constitutional change. And if the majority intends to suggest that the “major change” principle 
precludes recourse to the prerogative whether or not that is contrary to legislation, it is hard to 
see how parliamentary sovereignty can be relevant. After all, the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty does not ordain that the UK Parliament has, or must have, a monopoly over law-
making; rather, it is concerned with the legal status of the laws that it does make.  
More generally, any argument that seeks to anchor a “major change” restriction on the 
prerogative in the principle of parliamentary sovereignty risks collapsing into circularity. In 
Miller, the key question, for present purposes, was whether the ECA should be construed as 
leaving open the possibility of prerogative-initiated withdrawal from the EU. To suggest that 
the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty assists in reaching the conclusion that the ECA 
should be construed as foreclosing that possibility (because withdrawal is too great a 
constitutional matter for the prerogative) does no more than beg the question. The sovereignty 
principle is affronted by the use of the prerogative only if, in the first place, the statute leaves 
no room for the prerogative to be exercised, raising the question: “What does the statute 
mean?” The sovereignty doctrine is thus pertinent only insofar as it prevents the prerogative 
from being used in opposition to the statute: the sovereignty doctrine is the source of the 
relevant prohibition upon the use of the prerogative, but it cannot be an aid to the interpretive 
process that determines whether the prohibition is relevant.  
Sovereignty thus cannot straightforwardly be the “fundamental principle” that helps to 
determine whether a constitutional change is too great in scale to be effected via the 
prerogative. And, if it is not the sovereignty doctrine that performs that role, it is not clear what 
else it is. It might conceivably be the separation of powers, but that too would be problematic. 
For one thing, the separation of powers is mentioned nowhere in the majority’s judgment. And 
even if the majority’s constitutional scale argument channels without name-checking the 
separation of powers (in that it reflects that certain, i.e. “major”, matters are allocated to the 
legislative rather than the executive branch) we must once again confront the question of how 
such matters are to be identified. Just as parliamentary sovereignty cannot assist in that 
inquiry, neither, arguably, can the separation of powers. The making and unmaking of treaty 
                                                 
42 Miller, at [81]. 
43 Miller, at [82].  
commitments is, after all, an executive matter par excellence. And while it ceases to be so if 
the exercise of the prerogative would be incompatible with statute — an axiom that might be 
considered to reflect the subservience of the executive to the legislature under the separation 
of powers — that doctrine, thus conceived, serves as little more than a metaphor for 
parliamentary sovereignty which, as we have seen, is of limited assistance. The upshot is that 
the majority’s constitutional scale criterion, upon which much of its reasoning hangs, is both 
highly imprecise and built upon a normative foundation that is, at best, obscure.  
IV.  THE DOMESTIC LEGAL STATUS OF EU LAW 
A.  EU law as a “direct” and “independent” source of domestic law 
If the majority reasoning so far considered is susceptible to criticism on the ground that it is 
built upon a murky distinction between “major” and other constitutional changes, the same is 
not true of the other principal aspect of the majority’s judgment. Indeed, it invokes a bright-line 
distinction between things that respectively fall within the scope of the treaty-making 
prerogative and those that do not. For the majority, the act of triggering Article 50 involves 
changing domestic law, thereby placing that act in a category that is beyond the reach of 
prerogative authority. Central to this reasoning is the majority’s analysis of the domestic 
source and status of EU law. The majority concedes that “[i]n one sense” UK law, in the form 
of the ECA, “is the source of EU law” within the domestic system, because “without that Act, 
EU law would have no domestic status”.44 However, without repudiating that analysis, the 
majority declares it inadequately “realistic”, and states its preference for the view that “it is the 
institutions of the EU which are the relevant source of [EU] law”.45 Indeed, the majority goes 
as far as to opine that EU law is “an independent and over-riding source of domestic law”46 
and that “the EU Treaties, EU legislation and the interpretations placed on these instruments 
by the Court of Justice are direct sources of UK law”.47  
That EU law can take priority over domestic law, including Acts of Parliament, is clear 
— and has been since the House of Lords’ judgment in Factortame (No 2).48 However, by 
stating that EU law is an “over-riding” source of domestic law, the majority implies that EU law 
necessarily and invariably has priority. Indeed, elsewhere in the majority judgment, it is baldly 
asserted that EU law has “overriding supremacy in the hierarchy of domestic law sources”.49 
This is, putting it mildly, an analysis that lacks nuance, and is hard to reconcile with the 
Supreme Court’s own analysis in the earlier HS2 case. There, the Court concluded that the 
extent of EU law’s effect in the UK is to be determined by reference by the ECA, and that 
                                                 
44 Miller, at [61] 
45 Miller, at [61] 
46 Miller, at [65], [80].  
47 Miller, at [61].  
48 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd (No 2) [1991] 1 AC 603.  
49 Miller, at [81].  
whether EU law has priority over legislative or common law provisions that embody 
fundamental constitutional values turns upon the proper construction of the ECA.50  
 However, for present purposes, it is the majority’s claim that EU law is a “direct” and 
“independent” source of domestic law that is particularly pertinent. Indeed, this 
characterisation of EU law’s status plays a decisive role in the majority’s analysis. For if, as 
the majority concludes, the EU Treaties and EU legislation are independent, direct sources of 
domestic law, then the norms that they stipulate are domestic law in precisely the same sense 
as Acts of Parliament and the common law. On this view, it becomes impossible to resist the 
conclusion that the prerogative cannot be used to alter or remove EU law — because, even if 
it is styled “EU law” for the purpose of descriptive convenience, it is, in a taxonomical sense, 
domestic law. It is therefore inapt to ask whether the ECA has operated so as to constrain the 
use of the treaty-making prerogative, because in the first place the alteration of domestic law 
(by excising those of its elements that originated through the UK’s membership of the EU) 
inevitably falls outside the ambit of the prerogative. Moreover, according to the majority, it is 
not just the case that the prerogative cannot be used to remove or change (what, on their 
view, is properly to be characterised as) domestic law: neither can the prerogative be used to 
remove a source of such law. For the majority, then, it follows that  
rather than the Secretary of State being able to rely on the absence in the 1972 
Act of any exclusion of the prerogative power to withdraw from the EU Treaties, 
the proper analysis is that, unless that Act positively created such a power in 
relation to those Treaties [which it did not], it does not exist.51 
B.  Two analytical vehicles 
But is the majority right in the first place to characterise EU law as a source of domestic law, 
such that the prerogative cannot be used to remove the source and/or to disturb the law that 
has flowed from it? In answering that question, it is important to be clear that there are two — 
and only two — analytical vehicles that might serve to explain how directly applicable and 
directly effective EU law52 came to have effect within the UK legal system.  
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 The first possibility is one that was notably canvassed by Sir William Wade, according 
to which the UK’s “rule of recognition” may have been altered as a result of EU membership.53 
On this analysis, EU law falls to be recognised as law in the UK because the rule of recognition 
— behind which we cannot go, because it owes its authority to no prior rule — so requires. 
Examining matters in this way enables not just the authority, but also the priority, of EU law to 
be accounted for, since on this analysis the rule of recognition has adapted not only so as to 
acknowledge EU law as a source of law but also so as to treat other norms as valid laws only 
to the extent of their compatibility with EU law. This is not the occasion on which to evaluate 
attempts to understand EU law’s domestic effect by recourse to a change in the rule of 
recognition. It suffices, for the purpose of the present argument, to observe that none of the 
Justices who decided Miller relied upon such an analysis. Indeed, it was explicitly repudiated. 
Having noted that the ECA had wrought an “unprecedented state of affairs” by facilitating EU 
law’s primacy over Acts of Parliament, the majority went on to say that “consistently with the 
principle of Parliamentary sovereignty … the 1972 Act can be repealed like any other 
statute”.54 The majority continued: “For that reason, we would not accept that the so-called 
fundamental rule of recognition (ie the fundamental rule by reference to which all other rules 
are validated) underlying UK laws has been varied by the 1972 Act or would be varied by its 
repeal.”55 
 This leaves only one other possible explanation for EU law’s applicability within the UK 
legal system. If the rule of recognition does not acknowledge the EU Treaties and EU 
legislation as a form of law applicable in the UK, then the domestic applicability of those 
instruments must instead have been provided for by some norm that is acknowledged by the 
rule of recognition as a source of law. Lord Reed clearly acknowledged this in his dissenting 
judgment. In common with the majority, he took the view that “[t]he UK’s entry into the EU did 
not … alter its rule of recognition, and neither would its withdrawal”.56 However, Lord Reed, 
unlike the majority, went on unequivocally to acknowledge the logical implication of this 
conclusion. If EU law did not acquire effect in the UK by virtue of its acknowledgment by the 
rule of recognition itself, it followed that its effect must be attributable to a form of law that is 
so acknowledged.57 Lord Reed observed that this analysis is consistent with Parliament’s own 
understanding of the position, as set out in the European Union Act 2011, s. 18, according to 
which directly applicable and directly effective EU law “falls to be recognised and available in 
law in the United Kingdom only by virtue of” the ECA or other relevant Acts.58 Lord Reed also 
noted59 that his analysis was consistent with the analyses advanced by the Supreme Court in 
the Pham60 and HS261 cases.  
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On this view, EU law is not domestic law in any normal or ultimate sense. Rather it 
forms a distinct body of law that has effect in domestic law, in the sense of being enforceable 
in national legal proceedings. As Lord Reed put it: “The 1972 Act did not create statutory rights 
in the same sense as other statutes, but gave legal effect in the UK to a body of law now 
known as EU law.”62 And, crucially, as Lord Reed went on to explain, that “body of law” only 
has such domestic effect as law that really is domestic law provides: “EU law is not itself an 
independent source of domestic law, but depends for its effect in domestic law on the 1972 
Act: an Act which does not confer effect upon it automatically and without qualification, but 
has to be interpreted and applied in the wider context of the constitutional law of the UK.”63 
From this analysis flow two significant consequences. First, EU law, because it is not 
domestic law in the normal sense, is not necessarily invulnerable to excision from the domestic 
legal order by operation of the prerogative. The axiom that the prerogative cannot be used to 
change domestic law does not bite directly upon EU law if it is not, in the first place, domestic 
law. Second, the only relevant thing upon which that axiom can bite is the ECA. If the ECA 
rules out the use of the prerogative for the purpose of effecting EU withdrawal, thereby 
excising EU law from the domestic legal order, then of course the prerogative cannot be used 
for that purpose. But that simply takes us back to questions, considered in the previous 
section, concerning the interpretation of the ECA — in particular, whether it precludes the use 
of the prerogative for the purpose of effecting withdrawal.  
C.  The majority’s analysis assessed 
Ultimately, the majority’s analysis of the “source of law” issue falls uncomfortably between two 
stools, and fails to provide a coherent intellectual basis for its argument that the prerogative is 
necessarily unavailable. The difficulties with its analysis become readily apparent when we 
confront the four key propositions advanced by the majority on this issue. The propositions 
are as follows:  
(1) The rule of recognition has not changed.64 
(2) EU law has force in the UK only because of the ECA.65  
(3) Proposition (2) is insufficiently realistic.66  
(4) EU law is a direct and independent source of domestic law.67  
If the central proposition — proposition (4) — is to mean anything, it must surely mean that 
EU law is a source of law whose status as such is independent of its acknowledgment by other 
sources of law, such as UK legislation. It is hard, therefore, to see how proposition (4) can 
stand with proposition (1), given that a source of law can only be independent in the relevant 
sense if it is acknowledged as a source of law by the rule of recognition. It is also difficult to 
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understand how proposition (2) can be reconciled with (3), and how proposition (2) can be 
reconciled with (4). The majority appears to end up contending that EU law is both dependent 
for its domestic status upon the ECA (proposition (2)) and an independent source of domestic 
law (proposition (4)).   
There are two ways in which a reconciliation of these propositions might be attempted. 
The first relies upon a metaphysical sleight of hand, whereby the ECA is capable of rendering 
EU law an independent source of domestic law while remaining capable of terminating EU 
law’s status as such. But this attempt is doomed to failure. Even if it were somehow possible 
for the ECA to release the EU law genie from the bottle, thus turning it into an independent 
source of domestic law, its characterisation as such is meaningless if the repeal of the ECA is 
capable of returning the genie to the bottle. It is hard to escape the conclusion that if the rule 
of recognition has not changed, Lord Reed must be right, and EU law’s effect in the UK must 
be attributable to, shaped by, and ultimately dependent upon the ECA.  
The second possibility is to conclude that the majority’s characterisation of the EU 
Treaties and EU legislation as “direct” and “independent” sources of law is largely meaningless 
in legal terms. Rather, on this view, it amounts to little more than a rhetorical flourish or 
descriptive insight — in the sense that it describes the reality that the EU makes laws that 
have effects in the UK. But if the point goes no further than this, then it has no bearing upon 
the domestic legal status of EU law, leaving that question to be answered wholly by reference 
to the proper construction of the ECA. It follows that while understanding the majority’s “source 
of law” argument in this limited way carries the benefit of rescuing it from incoherence — 
because it is no longer forms part of a set of flatly contradictory claims — it does so at the cost 
of emptying the argument of legal significance.  
Indeed, if all that the majority is actually offering is an empirical observation that the 
laws given effect by the ECA are produced by the EU, and that closing off that source of 
production would have important consequences, then its “source of law” analysis becomes 
little more than a version of its “constitutional scale” argument. On this view, however, the 
notion that EU law is a direct and independent source of domestic law ends up being far from 
the slam-dunk argument that the majority presupposes. Instead, it remains the case that EU 
law is — as Lord Reed unequivocally recognises — a body of law that has whatever domestic 
effect is provided for by the ECA and whatever domestic status it is accorded by that 
legislation. If the descriptive status of the EU Treaties and EU legislation as a “source of law” 
is somehow relevant to the construction of the ECA — because, for instance, it is felt to 
buttress the argument about the scale of the constitutional change implied by withdrawal — 
then so be it. It is far from clear, however, that the “source of law” argument, to the extent that 
it can be understood as a coherent one, is capable of adding any independent value to the 
majority’s analysis.  
  
V.  DEVOLUTION AND THE SEWEL CONVENTION 
A.  The Supreme Court’s general approach to conventions 
When Miller was decided by the Divisional Court, the focus was squarely on the issues 
addressed in sections II–IV of this article. However, by the time the case reached the Supreme 
Court, the constitutional lens being applied had broadened considerably. For one thing, the 
Supreme Court was required to determine devolution issues referred to it from Northern 
Ireland, including in the context of litigation that had taken place there in the High Court.68 In 
addition, devolution arguments were raised before the Supreme Court by intervening parties 
— including, on behalf of the Scottish and Welsh administrations respectively, the Lord 
Advocate and the Counsel General for Wales. The application of this wider lens had at least 
the capacity to produce a substantially different constitutional image. Viewed thus, the case 
ceased to be concerned exclusively with a familiar — though, in this context at least, vexed 
— question about the demarcation of legislative and executive authority, and extended to the 
relationship between different loci of authority within the UK’s multi-layered territorial 
constitution. 
 That is not, however, to deny that the devolution issues raised before the Supreme 
Court overlapped to some extent with those considered earlier in this article. For instance, the 
Court was asked to determine whether, like the ECA, the Northern Ireland Act 1998 (“NIA”) 
precluded recourse to the prerogative for the purpose of invoking Article 50. The majority 
observed that the NIA had “conferred rights on the citizens of Northern Ireland” by equipping 
them to challenge executive and legislative action on the ground of incompatibility with EU 
law.69 The majority went on to say — in line with the reasoning it had deployed in respect of 
the ECA — that since “it is normally impermissible for statutory rights to be removed by the 
exercise of prerogative powers in the international sphere”, it would be “incongruous if 
constraints imposed on the legislative competence of the devolved administrations by specific 
statutory provisions were to be removed, thereby enlarging that competence, other than by 
statute”.70 The majority did not, though, go beyond this observation, saying that its conclusion 
regarding the ECA made it unnecessary to reach “a definitive view” about whether the NIA 
imposed “a discrete requirement for Parliamentary legislation”.71 
 However, in addition to these arguments about the interaction of the prerogative with 
the NIA — and, implicitly, with the other devolution legislation — the Court was also confronted 
with a different kind of devolution-related question. Given that — in the light of the majority’s 
stance on the prerogative issue — primary legislation was required before notice could be 
served under Article 50(2), was it necessary to secure the consent of the devolved legislatures 
to such legislation? At the core of this question lies the Sewel convention, which is recorded 
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in a Memorandum of Understanding between the UK and devolved governments72 as well as 
in the Cabinet Manual.73 According to those sources, the convention is that “the UK Parliament 
would not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters except with the agreement of the 
devolved legislature”. Such written statements cannot, however, be authoritative in the way 
that legislation can be decisive as to what the law is. Constitutional conventions can and do 
evolve, and the Sewel convention is now generally understood in terms that are broader than 
those in which it is set out in the Memorandum of Understanding and the Cabinet Manual. In 
particular, it is taken to extend, at least in relation to Scotland and Wales, not only to UK 
legislation that deals with matters that have been devolved, but also to UK legislation that 
determines the scope of what is devolved.74 Crucially, as the majority pointed out in Miller: 
“The removal of the EU constraints on withdrawal from the EU Treaties will alter the 
competence of the devolved institutions unless new legislative constraints are introduced.”75 
It followed that, without such new constraints, withdrawal would “enhance” devolved 
competence.76 This raised the question of whether devolved consent to legislation initiating 
withdrawal was required by the Convention.  
 But the Court refused to answer that question. Judges, it was said, “are neither the 
parents nor the guardians of political conventions; they are merely observers”. This meant that 
while courts “can recognise the operation of a political convention in the context of deciding a 
legal question”, it was not open to them to “give legal rulings on its operation or scope”. Those 
matters, it was said, were determined in “the political world”.77 Since it was, on this view, 
constitutionally improper for the Court to decide whether the Sewel convention applied, there 
could be no question of the Court enforcing the convention. But for good measure, the majority 
made it perfectly clear that there was no possibility of enforcement anyway. In doing so, the 
majority endorsed the view of the Supreme Court of Canada that: “The very nature of a 
convention … is inconsistent with its legal enforcement.”78  
The adoption in Miller of this view of the role of conventions is arguably as significant 
— at least in terms of what it tells us about the Supreme Court’s understanding of the 
contemporary constitution — as the stance it took on the relationship between the ECA and 
the prerogative. This is so because of both its general implications for the relationship between 
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law and convention and its implications for the nature of the territorial constitution. Those two 
points will be developed in turn.  
B.  Law and convention 
The Court’s view of the role of constitutional conventions — and of their relationship with law 
— is notably conservative. Judicial reticence in respect of convention chimes, of course, with 
Diceyan orthodoxy, and the notion that courts cannot enforce conventions is generally, albeit 
not universally,79 accepted. But to suggest that courts cannot rule on the “operation” or “scope” 
of conventions is to take a strikingly narrow view of the proper extent of judicial engagement 
with conventions. Three issues arise.  
 First, Miller sits uncomfortably with existing case law. For instance, in Evans, the Upper 
Tribunal engaged in notably detailed analysis of conventions pertaining to the constitutional 
role of the heir to the throne. It did so in the course of determining — as was required by the 
Freedom of Information Act 2000 — whether the public interest favoured disclosure of Prince 
Charles’s “advocacy correspondence” with Ministers.80 The Tribunal concluded that while “the 
heir to the throne is entitled and bound by constitutional convention to be educated in and 
about the business of government”, 81  the “education convention” did not extend to 
engagement by the heir in advocacy concerning his views on matters of public policy. In 
reaching this view, the Tribunal recognised that it was “decid[ing] the extent of the 
constitutional convention”.82 And while it acknowledged that a court or tribunal “only rarely” 
has to undertake such a task, and that it was a task that should be undertaken “with 
circumspection”,83 those considerations did not deter the Tribunal from determining that the 
matters before it fell outwith the convention’s scope.  
A similar point can be made in respect of the Jonathan Cape case, in which the court 
took into account (and took a view about the scope of) the convention of Cabinet responsibility 
in determining a legal question concerning breach of confidence.84 Indeed, Lord Widgery C.J. 
found that there was “overwhelming evidence that the doctrine of joint responsibility is 
generally understood and practised” as well as “equally strong evidence that it is on occasion 
ignored”.85 This led him to the conclusion that “the doctrine is an established feature of the 
English form of government, and it follows that some matters leading up to a Cabinet decision 
may be regarded as confidential”.86 
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Second, the foregoing point, taken on its own, would be of limited value. It is, after all, 
open to the UK Supreme Court to take a view that is at odds with the judgments of lower courts 
and tribunals — albeit that one might reasonably expect the Court to acknowledge and justify 
its departure from their jurisprudence. However, the willingness of those other bodies to 
grapple with questions concerning the operation and scope of conventions serves to highlight 
not merely a point of distinction with the Miller judgment, but also a fundamental tension within 
it. As already noted, the majority acknowledges that courts can recognise the operation of a 
political convention in the context of deciding a legal question. It stands to reason, however, 
that if conventions are to play a meaningful role in the resolution of legal questions to which 
they are pertinent, the court may well have to take a view about how the convention works 
and what its scope is. The Court cannot have it both ways. If the judicial role really is as limited 
as the majority contends, such that courts will retreat whenever issues pertaining to 
conventions are contested, then the notion that conventions can be taken into account when 
determining relevant legal questions is largely emptied of content.  
That leads on to a third point — that the highly constricted judicial role vis-à-vis 
conventions which the Supreme Court envisages is normatively dubious. The approach 
adopted in Miller risks marginalising conventions’ role in constitutional adjudication: as already 
observed, if courts are to walk away from questions about conventions whenever answering 
them would require determination of their operation or scope, courts will engage with 
conventions rarely. To proceed in such a way would risk the impoverishment of constitutional 
adjudication. Conventions can, and often do, amount to the crystallisation in tangible form of 
fundamental constitutional principles. The Sewel convention is a case in point. Its practical 
incentivisation of a form of institutional comity reflects an underlying normative reality — that 
devolution’s technically “top-down” nature notwithstanding, the modern territorial constitution 
is premised upon constitutional actors’ mutual respect for each other’s constitutional spheres 
of authority. In this way, constitutional conventions have the potential to inform, and perhaps 
on occasion decisively affect, the determination of legal-constitutional disputes by enabling 
norms that receive recognition primarily through convention to shape relevant legal analysis.  
It might be argued that the Court’s unwillingness to engage with the Sewel convention 
is justifiable because the determination of the issues relating to it were not necessary for the 
purpose of resolving the legal question before the Court. There is some mileage in that 
argument: the resolution of the legal question (“Was legislation needed?”) bore upon the 
question whether the Convention was engaged, but the latter did not bear upon the former. 
However, this point is not a complete answer to the position adopted by the Court in respect 
of the Sewel convention. For one thing, the convention was arguably directly relevant to the 
legal question as to what would constitute a decision by the UK to leave the EU “in accordance 
with its own constitutional requirements”.87 For instance, the Lord Advocate argued, on behalf 
of the Scottish Government, that: “The ‘constitutional requirements’, according to which a 
decision to withdraw from the EU must be taken, … include (i) the legal requirement for an Act 
of the UK Parliament; and (ii) [compliance with] the Legislative Consent Convention.”88 In its 
judgment, the Court did not take a position as to the correctness of this submission, the focus 
of the litigation (curiously) having been upon the lawfulness of serving notice under Article 
50(2), rather than upon the question whether, in the first place, a valid “decision” had been 
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taken under Article 50(1) in accordance with relevant “constitutional requirements”. But the 
Lord Advocate’s submission serves to highlight the broader point that the Court’s 
unwillingness to determine questions relating to the operation and scope of conventions 
largely undercuts its assertion that conventions can be “recognise[d]” by courts “in the context 
of deciding a legal question”.89 On the Court’s view, even if the Lord Advocate’s argument had 
been considered, it would have been impossible to determine its correctness, because that 
would have required the Court first to take the impermissible step of deciding upon the scope 
and operation of the convention.  
It follows that even if the Court’s refusal to resolve questions about the Sewel 
convention is defensible on the ground that such questions were not pertinent to a legal matter 
that was directly in issue, the Court’s general approach to conventions in Miller suggests that 
the scope for examining legal questions in the light of relevant conventions is heavily 
constricted. And therein lies a paradox: while the majority was prepared to invoke 
unarticulated constitutional principles in defence of its view that the prerogative could not be 
used to effect “major” changes or remove or a “source of law”, the position it adopted in relation 
to conventions is liable to have the effect of marginalising the role that such conventions — 
and the often fundamental principles that animate them — can play in constitutional 
adjudication.  
C.  The territorial constitution  
The discussion so far presupposes that the Sewel convention is precisely that — a convention. 
However, the position is (it might be thought) complicated by the statutory reference to the 
substance of the convention now found in the Scotland Act 1998. Section 28(7) of that Act 
avers that: “This section” — which invests the Scottish Parliament with law-making authority 
— “does not affect the power of the Parliament of the United Kingdom to make laws for 
Scotland.” However, thanks to the Scotland Act 2016, section 28(7) of the 1998 Act is now 
glossed by section 28(8). It says, in language that tracks the convention, that “it is recognised 
that the Parliament of the United Kingdom will not normally legislate with regard to devolved 
matters without the consent of the Scottish Parliament”. Section 2 of the Wales Act 2017 — 
which was not in force when Miller was decided — inserts a new section 107(6) into the 
Government of Wales Act 2006, making substantially identical provision in respect of Wales.  
 This statutory acknowledgment of the substance of the Sewel convention 
notwithstanding, the Court concluded that it remained nothing more than a convention. In 
particular, it was held that the UK Parliament, by inserting section 28(8) into the Scotland Act 
1998, had not been “seeking to convert the Sewel Convention into a rule which can be 
interpreted, let alone enforced, by the courts”. 90  Rather, it had been “declaring that [the 
convention] is a permanent feature of the relevant devolution settlement”91 and “entrench[ing] 
it as a convention”. 92  This analysis of what Parliament was trying to do is far from 
straightforward. It is, for instance, unclear what is entailed by the “entrenchment” of a 
                                                 
89 Miller, at [146]. 
90 Miller, at [148]. 
91 Miller, at [148]. 
92 Miller, at [149]. 
convention, or in what sense the convention is rendered “permanent” by section 28(8). If the 
Sewel convention continues to be nothing more than a convention, then its normative source 
lies outside any legislation, and it remains a product of political consensus. If that consensus 
develops (or breaks down) then the convention will evolve (or disintegrate). The convention, 
if that is all it is, cannot therefore straightforwardly be entrenched or otherwise made 
permanent by reference to it in legislation. That said, it is of course arguable that such 
reference may serve at some level as evidence of a political commitment to the convention. 
Even then, however, the statutory reference must be of limited import if the Sewel convention 
remains no more than that, given that legislation enacted in 2016 (in respect of Scotland) and 
2017 (in respect of Wales) can be evidence only of political commitments that existed at those 
points in time.  
 While the Court’s analysis of the (very limited) effect that section 28(8) does have is 
vague, its stance on the effect it does not have is much clearer. In particular, the Court held 
that section 28(8) does not turn the Sewel convention into a legal restriction upon the 
legislative capacity of the UK Parliament. On this point, the Court is surely correct. For one 
thing, it far from clear that the UK Parliament is capable of limiting its authority in such a way. 
But, leaving that point to one side, it is tolerably clear that that is not what was intended. In 
particular, by prefacing its reference to the substance of the convention with the words “it is 
recognised”, section 28(8) makes plain that it is merely acknowledging the existence of the 
convention, rather than legislatively transforming it into a legal requirement. The Court thus 
adopted an entirely defensible position when it said that it “would have expected [the] UK 
Parliament to have used other words if it were seeking to convert a convention into a legal 
rule justiciable by the courts”.93 
 However, while the Court’s legal analysis of this point is sound, it lays bare the smoke-
and-mirrors exercise to which section 28(8) of the Scotland Act 1998 — and now section 
107(6) of the Government of Wales Act 2006 — reduces. It is, of course, unlikely that the UK 
Government expected the legal effect of those provisions to be judicially tested — and their 
legal redundancy so amply demonstrated — so soon after their enactment. Yet that is 
precisely what Miller does. Indeed, the UK Government conceded as much in its written 
argument, referring to the “legal irrelevance” of the Sewel Convention,94 reasserting that “the 
Westminster Parliament is sovereign and may legislate at any time on any matter”,95 and 
arguing that “[n]othing in that analysis is affected” by section 28(8).96 By adopting this view, 
the Court demonstrates that the new provisions acknowledging the convention amount to 
nothing more than political tokens dressed in legislative garb. It follows that, when push comes 
to shove, the political niceties of institutional comity reflected in the Sewel convention founder 
upon the hard legal rocks of (Westminster’s) legislative supremacy, the window-dressing 
supplied by sections 28(8) and 107(6) of the respective devolution statutes notwithstanding.  
  
                                                 
93 Miller, at [148]. 
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VI.  THE BIGGER CONSTITUTIONAL PICTURE 
A.  Introduction  
Miller is doubtless one of the most-discussed cases of recent times. Indeed, the level of debate 
that it stimulated among commentators well before judgments were given by either the 
Divisional Court or the Supreme Court is probably unparalleled.97 The volume of discussion 
precipitated by the case can be attributed in part to a combination of the significance of the 
legal-constitutional issues raised by it and the political crucible in which they fell to be 
determined during the immediate aftermath of referendum. However, the amount of debate 
that took place is also a function of the level of disagreement that the case stimulated, several 
aspects of which are reflected, at least to some extent, in the contrasting judgments given in 
the Supreme Court. Why, then, did the case prove to be so intellectually divisive? And what 
does the fact that it provoked so much controversy tell us about its wider constitutional 
significance? 
 Shorn — as, for the purpose of legal analysis, it must be — of the extraordinary political 
circumstances in which it was decided, Miller is in one sense an unlikely candidate for the 
degree of disagreement it excited. The central question that the Court had to determine can 
be framed in relatively straightforward terms (even if the substance of the question turned out 
to be less than straightforward). The question, in essence, concerned whether — and, if so, 
how — a statutory provision operated upon the Crown’s treaty-making prerogative. Moreover, 
the constitutional ground-rules governing the interoperation of statute and prerogative are 
relatively settled, and were not the subject of significant disagreement between the majority 
and minority judges in Miller. Why, then, did the issues raised by the case attract such 
controversy? For one thing, the ECA, thanks to its opaque drafting, raised particularly difficult 
and uncertain questions of statutory interpretation. Meanwhile, although the constitutional 
ground-rules concerning the relationship between statute and prerogative were themselves 
relatively uncontentious, the hinterland of constitutional principle by reference to which those 
ground-rules fell to be applied — and, crucially, in the light of which the ECA had to be 
construed — was far more contestable and uncertain in nature.  
 In the light of these considerations, it is possible to step back from the technical 
particularities of Miller and to ask some broader questions about the underlying causes of the 
disagreement between the majority and dissenting judges (and about the causes of the 
discord evidenced by the wider debate about Miller). Those causes lie in two principal (and 
related) factors — namely, the range of constitutional principles that are relevant and the style 
of constitutional adjudication via which those principles are judicially curated.  
  
                                                 
97 At least when judged in terms of published debate. That debate played out in a wide variety of fora, 
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B.  Constitutional principle  
It might well be argued that the majority judgment is progressive in nature, striking, as it does, 
a blow against the anachronistic prerogative powers of the Crown and focussing authority in 
a democratic legislative institution. Miller can thus be characterised as a victory for Parliament 
over the executive: of the prioritisation of considerations of democracy and accountability and, 
in that loose sense, as a reaffirmation of parliamentary sovereignty itself. It might, of course, 
be retorted that in the end the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017 — the 
enactment of which was necessitated by the majority’s insistence upon parliamentary 
legislative involvement — was something of a damp squib, Parliament having signally failed 
to take the chances it was afforded to shape the Government’s negotiating position and secure 
Parliament’s own role in respect of the exit process. But such criticism, while politically highly 
pertinent, is legally and constitutionally insubstantial, the crucial point being that the Miller 
judgment gave Parliament the chance to have democratic input and insist upon oversight.  
Thus one way of characterising the fissure between the judgments in Miller — and the 
broader positions for which they stand — is in terms of their progressiveness, the majority’s 
judgment standing in contrast to what might be regarded as the more conservative approach 
of Lord Reed. However, any attempt to analyse Miller in this way must be undertaken with 
caution. From a different perspective — which goes to the range of constitutional principles 
taken to be implicated by the case — the majority judgment arguably takes on a different 
complexion. Indeed, it can be argued that Miller is (paradoxically) lent a progressive air only if 
it is in the first place viewed through a relatively traditional lens — one that postulates 
constitutional adjudication in terms of the refereeing of a zero-sum game in which Westminster 
and Whitehall are the sole participants. Examined thus, the majority’s prioritisation of 
Parliament’s role, given its credentials of democratic representativeness and accountability, 
has an evident constitutional-normative appeal. But viewing the contemporary constitution in 
this way is liable to yield an incomplete picture of it. As Miller itself so clearly illustrates, the 
British constitution is today a far more complex decisional space — in which the electorate, 
through referendums, and devolved legislatures and administrations play a role — than can 
be accommodated by an analysis that simply pits the Westminster Parliament and the central 
government against one another, with courts serving as honest brokers. That much is 
apparent when one considers the broader constitutional backdrop against which Miller must 
be viewed.  
To begin with, there is the referendum itself. A bald, prerogative-based constitutional 
power grab by the executive at the expense of Parliament is one thing. But the constitutional 
offensiveness of using prerogative power in the circumstances with which Miller was 
concerned cannot sensibly be evaluated without reference to the fact that such power would 
have been being deployed so as to implement the outcome of a referendum that constituted 
one of the largest democratic exercises ever undertaken in the UK, and which, in the first 
place, had been provided for by Parliament through primary legislation. Meanwhile, the rigidity 
of the distinction drawn by the majority judgment between legal and political elements of the 
constitution yielded an outright refusal to engage with any questions concerning the Sewel 
convention — which, as we have seen, institutionalises a fundamental principle governing the 
operation of the contemporary territorial constitution. That the Court did not engage with the 
referendum or the convention are not themselves grounds for arguing that it went 
straightforwardly wrong as a matter of law. But they do serve to demonstrate that the legal 
issues addressed by the Court in Miller formed only a subset of the constitutional issues that 
were at stake.  
If, then, Miller represents a victory for constitutional principle in general, and for the 
principle of parliamentary sovereignty in particular, then it reduces to a victory for a particular 
understanding of the constitutional order. Of course, the nature of the UK’s constitution is such 
that there has always been a distinction between its legal and its political aspects, such that 
the answers to legal-constitutional questions may be at odds with, or may fail to take account 
of, elements of the constitution that form part of its political limb. But Miller throws that 
distinction into sharp relief, the Court’s focus having been exclusively on the demarcation of 
authority as between the UK Parliament and Government, without reference to the fact that 
— as is increasingly common — a referendum had taken place, and without reference to the 
participative constitutional claims advanced by the devolved institutions.  
This article has levelled a number of criticisms at the majority judgment. That the 
majority did not straightforwardly conclude that the referendum overrode the claimant’s 
argument or that the Sewel Convention legally disabled the UK Parliament from legislating 
absent devolved consent are not among those criticisms, for such criticisms would be far too 
blunt. But those broader aspects of the case — which were not, and could not be, 
accommodated by an analysis predicated upon orthodox constitutional principle — give pause 
for thought when we turn our minds to the future trajectory of the UK constitution. The 
Divisional Court, in its judgment in Miller, gave a ringing endorsement to Dicey’s statement 
that: “The judges know nothing about any will of the people except in so far as that will is 
expressed by an Act of Parliament, and would never suffer the validity of a statute to be 
questioned on the ground of its having been passed or being kept alive in opposition to the 
wishes of the electors.”98 It would be rash to suggest that this tenet of orthodoxy should simply 
be abandoned in the face of a referendum, and “popular will” accorded free rein over the 
statute book. But increasing recourse to referendums as constitutional devices raises basic 
(yet profound) questions about the relationship between parliamentary and popular 
sovereignty — and about whether the normative claim exerted by the former must be viewed 
in the light of the extent of the normative claim made by the latter. If the sovereignty of 
Parliament is the central constitutional principle upheld by the majority judgment in Miller, and 
thus served as a basis for interpreting the ECA as the majority did, then the question at least 
arises whether the contours and demands of that principle fall to be evaluated in the light not 
of some inchoate notion of “the will of the people”, but in the light of the outcome of a 
referendum that Parliament itself provided for.  
Meanwhile, the disjunction between the legal doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty 
and the constitutional division of authority between governing institutions at the UK and 
devolved levels necessarily renders incomplete any adjudicative model that views the 
constitution through an exclusively legal lens. Fundamental constitutional principle cannot be 
remade overnight. But Miller nevertheless ought at least to trigger reflection upon the extent 
to which such principle is, or ought to be, cast in a new light by the contemporary nature of 
the constitutional order. Miller may thus on one analysis be considered a progressive blow 
against the archaism of Crown prerogative. Yet it might simultaneously be said to amount to 
a defence of a rather traditional approach that superimposes upon a multilateral constitutional 
order a vision of it that is myopically bilateral in nature.   
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C.  Constitutional adjudication 
As noted in the previous section, one benchmark by reference to which the decision in Miller 
might be judged relates to the range of constitutional principles that are drawn upon; 
depending upon what we think the operative principles are, or should, be, the majority’s stance 
might appear more or less progressive. A distinct (albeit related) perspective from which Miller 
might be evaluated concerns whatever one considers the proper qualities and characteristics 
of constitutional adjudication to be. It might be suggested — and indeed it has been argued99 
— that the majority and dissenting judgments in Miller reflect a broad distinction between form 
and substance. Viewed through this optic, the two approaches — depending on one’s 
underlying view — might be the subject of praise or criticism. For instance, Lord Reed might 
be congratulated for the logical punctiliousness of his analysis, or castigated for adopting a 
narrowly technical perspective that overlooks the enormity of what is at stake. (It will be noted 
that if one regards the latter as a pertinent criticism, then one implicitly endorses the major ity’s 
“constitutional scale” analysis.) Meanwhile, the majority might be condemned for an 
intellectual sloppiness that prizes over rigorous analysis an outcome that feels instinctively 
“right” — or it might be praised for conjuring a constitutional wood from the trees.  
 That such different perspectives can be brought to bear upon the Miller case hardly 
renders it unique. The Supreme Court’s judgment in Evans invites — at least superficially — 
the drawing of similar distinctions.100 That case concerned the scope and exercise of the 
Government’s “veto” power101 over decisions of the Upper Tribunal about the disclosure of 
information under the Freedom of Information Act 2000. Giving one of the majority judgments, 
Lord Neuberger, with whom Lords Kerr and Reed agreed,102 adopted an approach to the veto 
power that disclosed anything but a formal approach. Indeed, so radical was the interpretive 
surgery that they performed upon the legislation that Lord Wilson, in his dissent, said that they 
“re-wrote” the veto provision. 103  However, in one important respect, the fault-lines that 
separate the different judicial approaches found in Evans are distinct from those that are found 
in Miller. In Evans, the constitutional principles that were in play were clear, but the relative 
weight to be accorded to them was contested. At the risk of oversimplification, 104  Lords 
Neuberger, Kerr and Reed assigned great weight to rule of law and separation of powers 
considerations that told against a wide executive power to override the judgments of an 
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memos and the British constitution’s relational architecture" [2015] P.L. 539.  
independent judicial tribunal:105 they were thus prepared to permit those factors to exert very 
substantial influence over their construction of the provision. In contrast, while they certainly 
did not neglect to recognise the other constitutional values in play, the dissentients placed 
primary emphasis upon the principle of parliamentary sovereignty — which they took, rightly 
or wrongly, to require much closer adherence to the literal meaning of the statutory text. While, 
therefore, one might paint the dissentients in Evans as having adopted a “formal” approach in 
that they gave priority to a plain-words reading of the legislation, they were moved to do so by 
what they considered to be the overriding normative pull of a particular constitutional principle.  
 Miller, however, is different. Whereas Evans was characterised by uncertainty and 
disagreement as to the application and interaction of readily identifiable — and identified — 
constitutional principles, the majority judgment in Miller is characterised by opacity as to what, 
in the first place, the operative constitutional principles are. If, therefore, this is adjudication 
that is attentive to “substance” rather than “form”, then it is attentive to substance only in a 
particular — and questionable — way. Indeed, in the final analysis, the majority’s approach 
lapses into what might more accurately be dubbed instinctual, as distinct from substantive, 
constitutional adjudication. Such adjudication can properly be described as substantive only if 
it identifies and grapples with the substance of the pertinent constitutional principles. But that, 
as we have seen, is precisely what the majority fails to do, preferring instead to fall back on 
propositions that (on the one hand) assert requirements that are said to derive from 
constitutional principles but which (on the other hand) are too abstracted from those principles 
to amount to meaningful engagement with them.  
Constitutional adjudication that is substantive in the sense that it draws upon, applies 
and develops constitutional principle is perfectly legitimate, provided that any associated curial 
innovation is respectful of the parameters which that self-same constitutional principle sets in 
relation to the judicial role. But there is a further, and fundamental, proviso. Seeing the wood 
as well as the trees is all well and good — but that does not licence judges to reimagine the 
constitutional landscape without adequate reference to the component principles of which that 
landscape is made up. Indeed, to adopt the sort of approach that the majority took in Miller is 
not simply normatively dubious, it is prudentially unwise. The courts’ best defence against 
charges of improper activism lies in the accountability afforded by the discipline of giving 
rigorously reasoned judgments — a discipline that is all the more important when the stakes 
are as high as they were in Miller. A substantive, rather than a formal, approach to 
constitutional adjudication is wholly acceptable provided that it remains within these 
parameters. But it becomes both objectionable and imprudent if it is pursued in the 
intellectually lackadaisical manner that characterises the majority’s reasoning in Miller.  
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VII.  MILLER’S LEGACY 
By way of conclusion, it is worth asking what, in due course, Miller’s legacy might turn out to 
be — a question that is highly sensitive to the perspective from which it is asked. Five such 
perspectives — from the exclusively political, through the narrowly legal, to the broadly 
constitutional — might usefully be considered.  
 First, as far as the politics of Brexit are concerned, Miller barely registers. For a short 
time during the autumn and winter of 2016–17, the Miller litigation appeared, at least to some 
ardent Remainers, to have the capacity to derail, delay or at least influence the course of 
Brexit. But Parliament’s supine response once the ball had been put in its court by the Miller 
judgment put paid to any such ideas.  
 Second, however, Miller’s implications for the wider constitutional politics of the UK 
cannot be written off as easily. Of course, it is primarily Brexit itself that produces such 
implications, given the way in which the referendum laid bare the divergent constitutional 
futures preferred by the peoples of the UK’s four constituent nations. But Miller is relevant too, 
not least for the way in which it so fulsomely embraces the distinction between the 
constitutional realm’s legal and political dimensions, thereby throwing into especially sharp 
relief the tension between the legal doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and the quasi-federal 
political-constitutional structure of the modern UK. The latter finds its clearest expression in 
the Sewel convention — but the Court, as we have seen, refused to have any truck with it.  
 Third, in legal terms, Miller evidently has implications for the scope of the royal 
prerogative. But precisely what those implications are — and exactly how far they extend — 
is unclear. If the newly minted category of things that cannot now be accomplished using 
prerogative power does not extend (much) beyond making constitutional changes as far-
reaching as leaving the EU, then the future significance of Miller in this regard will be 
approximately nil. But the judgment’s implications will necessarily be greater if that category 
is wider — something that turns upon the as-yet hard-to-discern reach of the majority’s “scale” 
principle. Reading between the lines of the majority judgment, the impression is conveyed that 
that principle is liable to bite only in highly constricted circumstances, even if those 
circumstances are not precisely coterminous with withdrawal from the EU. But the very 
vagueness of the principle — a phenomenon that is compounded by its unarticulated 
normative underpinnings — makes it unwise to attempt to offer any firm prediction as to its 
precise reach.  
 A fourth perspective from which Miller’s significance can be examined pertains to the 
constitution’s conceptual and doctrinal architecture. The interaction of EU and UK law 
amounts to a unique laboratory in which there is at least the potential of glimpsing the inner 
workings of the constitution at especially close quarters. Of course, the specific questions with 
which Miller was concerned will likely become moot once the UK leaves the EU. But the way 
in which those questions fall to be answered has at least the potential to be of more enduring 
relevance, given the answers’ capacity to illuminate axiomatic issues. After all, how we 
account for the effect and status of EU law within the domestic legal system ought to tell us 
something profound about that system’s nature. Here, however, Miller has little to offer, thanks 
to the majority’s incoherent analysis of the relationship between EU and domestic law. If, as 
is probable, Miller was the UK apex court’s last substantial opportunity to draw constitutional 
lessons of lasting relevance from the UK’s European sojourn, it is an opportunity that went 
unrealised.  
 Fifth, and finally, Miller can — and must — be evaluated by reference to its wider 
implications for constitutional adjudication. Viewed from this vantage point, Miller serves as a 
reminder of how acutely sensitive the outcome of constitutional adjudication can be to the 
identification and construction of the constitutional principles that form the lens through which 
the relevant legal issues fall to be examined. It is as a result of that sensitivity that (for example) 
the majority’s analysis might be considered either a triumph of constitutional progressivism or 
a defence of an anachronistically bilateral conception of a newly multilateral political-
constitutional order. Which of those views of the judgment is preferable is a contestable 
question. What is less open to debate is the fact that the very contestability of the principles 
that were in play in Miller — and which are often in play in hard constitutional cases — places 
judges under a heavy burden to adopt an analytically robust and transparent approach when 
it comes to deciding such cases. The Miller majority signally failed to discharge that burden 
— signalling, perhaps, that no such burden was perceived, and that painting with the broadest 
of curial brushes is considered acceptable. If that is so, then Miller’s most significant legacy 
may prove to be one of adjudicative mode rather than constitutional substance (albeit that the 
two are inevitably intertwined to some extent). But if that is Miller’s potential, then it is a 
potential that must go unrealised if constitutional adjudication is to avoid assuming a palm-
tree character that would risk robbing it of political legitimacy.  
The notion that Miller represents the triumph of substance over form yields a 
superficially appealing narrative. But it is a narrative that is not sustainable. A legitimately 
substantive mode of constitutional adjudication must be not equated with the sort of inchoate 
instinctualism that characterised the judgment of the majority. Nor should analytical rigour be 
mistaken for arid formalism. Miller’s legacy might prove to extend to the conflation of such 
matters, and the resultant licensing of a newly muscular (yet crude) form of constitutional 
adjudication. It is to be hoped, however, that the deficiencies of the majority judgment will 
instead serve as a salutary reminder of the imperative need to marry the rhetoric of 
constitutional principle with the intellectual endeavour that its application and development 
properly entails.  
 
